Corporate governance has attracted much attention in the last decade since the Asian financial crisis and the outbreak of US corporate scandals, especially in the light of recent Global financial crises, which arose partly as a result of non-optimal corporate governance practices among several organisations across the globe.
Lack of managerial competencies and proper governance systems in the SME sector have been identified to swamp efforts at attracting such finance and thus are said to be the main barriers to SME development (Gockel & Akoena, 2002) . It is necessary then for proper management of the SME sector to ensure enhanced performance, given that this would have major implications for financing opportunities for the sector. Therefore, we believe that the adoption of good governance practices among SMEs may assist them to come out from the present chaos that they encounter in Sri Lanka.
Review of Literature

Board Composition
Boards of directors are essential elements to most definitions of corporate governance. They bring out the formal link between owners and their managers responsible for the day-today operations of the SME. & Wyatt, (1990) and Brickley et al. (1994) supported that the market reward firms for appointing non-executive directors. In other words, an SME with more outside directors will be perceived more favourably by the market and financial institutions than SMEs with more inside directors.
Board Size
SMEs by their nature tend to have very smaller board sizes. Jensen (1993) 
Board leadership (Duality)
Another imperative giving preference for the system where the CEO's role is separated from that of the board chairman. Yermack (1996) argues that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Relating CEO duality more specifically to firm performance, researchers, however, found mixed evidence.
Daily & Dalton (1992) found no relationship between CEO duality and performance in entrepreneurial firms. Brickley et al. (1997) showed that CEO duality is not associated with inferior performance. Rechner & Dalton (1991) also reported that companies with CEO duality have stronger financial performance relative to other companies.
Family ownership
It is often argued that the benefit of founding family leadership of firms is that family traits, such as trust, altruism and paternalism can create an atmosphere of love and commitment towards the business (James, 1999) and therefore curtail agency costs. Previous studies by James (1999) showed that founding family businesses provide special kind of corporate governance that offers lower agency costs and better performance. Other studies, however, indicated that entrepreneurs and managers of founding family firms are more likely to engage in managerial entrenchment to the detriment of the firm, resulting in weaker performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) .
Empirical research: method, data and analysis
This study is subject to certain delimitation in order to reach a representative set of the population. First, the restrictions concerning the legal form of companies were imposed:
we focused on limited companies and private We, therefore, checked for this problem using White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors and covariance. To ensure the robustness of the model, we also include three control variables, size, age, and debt ratio to minimise specification bias. These are standard variables in performance models.
Empirical results
Descriptive summary statistics
The descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table: The results of this study reveal that board The 
Regression results
Regression analysis is
